Abstract-Mechanism design for incentivizing strategic agents to maximize their sum of utilities (SoU) is a well-studied problem in the context of resource allocation in networks. There are, however, a number of network resource allocation problems of interest where a designer may have a different objective than maximization of the SoU. The obvious reason for seeking a different objective is that this notion of efficiency does not account for fairness of allocation. A second, more subtle, reason for demanding fairer allocation is that it indirectly implies less variation in taxes paid by agents. This is desirable in a situation where implicit individual agent budgetary constraints make payment of large taxes unrealistic. In this paper, we study a family of social utilities that provide fair allocation (with SoU being subsumed as an extreme case) and derive conditions under which Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation is possible. Furthermore, it is shown how a modification of the above-mentioned mechanism by adding just one message per agent can guarantee full Bayesian implementation, i.e., no extraneous equilibria. We consider the problem of demand-side management in smart grids as a specific motivating application, and through numerical analysis, it is demonstrated that in this application, the proposed method can result in significant gains in fairness of allocation and a reduction in tax variation among agents.
I. INTRODUCTION

M
ECHANISM design or incentive design is a well-established framework for dealing with decentralized resource allocation problems in the presence of strategic agents. The corresponding literature is vast, especially in the domain of dominant, Nash and Bayesian implementation, [1] - [5] .
There are several engineering applications where mechanism design has been studied for resource allocation in the presence of strategic agents. Provision of bandwidth for networks has been studied for different networks, such as unicast and multicast [6] - [10] . Power allocation in wireless networks has been considered in [11] , where the VCG mechanism was adapted for competition between stations, and in [12] where a mechanism that achieves Lindahl equilibrium allocation was presented. A similar problem of throughput maximization via mechanism design was solved in [13] . Truthful mechanisms for efficient spectrum allocation to selfish secondary users in a dynamic setting has been studied in [14] and [15] , while Huang et al. [16] proposed a mechanism that achieved max − min fair allocation. Demand-side management in smart grids using incentives has been studied in [17] - [19] . Finally, an online auction for pricing of electric vehicle charging has been studied in [20] and [21] .
In the area of Networks, a majority of the works start with the assumption that the social objective is the sum of individual utilities (SoU) of all the system's agents. There are, however, a number of problems of theoretical and practical interest where a designer may have a different objective than maximization of the SoU. Consider for example, a network where optimizing SoU results in one (or a few) agents receiving almost all the available resources (e.g. bandwidth) and everyone else receiving an appreciably lower portion. In such a case, the social planner may want to introduce fairness in the allocation process even if it means a slight reduction in revenue. In such a market where efficiency is defined by allocating through maximization of SoU, an agent can receive disproportionate allocation as long as he/she is able to pay for it. Even if agents have this capability, a designer may desire to move away from this notion of efficiency.
A second-more subtle-reason for a departure from the SoU social objective is the fact that the standard mechanism design framework does not provide any formal way of limiting the range of the taxes/subsidies required at equilibrium. This implies that the magnitude of the monetary transfers (taxes/subsidies) can vary greatly among agents (with those who benefit more from the allocation having to contribute more as well). This can be a significant practical problem since it does not take into account the budget constraints of individual agents.
The prevalence of SoU over fairness considerations in most of the mechanism design literature has strong mathematical reasons. The main reason is that for SoU, in conjunction with quasi-linear utilities, agents' individual goals can be aligned directly with the overall social objective, so that when agents maximize their net utility they are simultaneously maximizing the overall social objective. The VCG mechanism [22] is the most prominent example of this. For any agent i , his/her utility v(x; θ i ) is determined by the allocation x and their private type θ i . The SoU social objective is See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
− j =i v(x(φ); φ j )+ f i (φ −i ) precisely create a situation such that the user performs social objective maximization whilst maximizing self utility. As soon as one moves away from the SoU objective, due to the social and individual objectives not aligning with each other, basic design techniques like VCG mechanism are not useful. This is one of the main reasons why there are significantly fewer results on fairness in the mechanism design literature.
Cole et al. [23] use the concept of "proportional fairness" (same as maximizing the sum of log of utilities) to reduce disparity. The focus is on a tax-less mechanism where the contract proposes to throw away existing resources ("resourceburning") in order to tax untruthful agents. This mechanism achieves at least 1 e fraction of proportionally fair allocation. In [24] , optimal auctions in the Bayesian set up are derived, such that instead of efficiency maximization or revenue maximization, a linearly combined metric is maximized which favors exchange of goods at low prices (thereby ensuring fairer trade).
"Envy-freeness" is another well-known criterion for equitable allocations (see [25] ). This notion was originally proposed for exchange economies where an allocation is called envy-free if no agent is strictly better off by taking someone else's allocation instead of their own. 1 Such a notion was argued in terms of the stability it provides, since each agent may be content with what they have comparing to the possible option of acquiring someone else's allocation. This, however, is an ex-post notion and in general imposes quite stringent constraints on the design. For a large enough environment it may indeed be impossible to achieve envy-freeness in optimal allocation.
Max-min fairness is the one notion of fairness that has received the most attention in the literature. Porter et al. [26] consider the mechanism design problem under perfect information with weak budget balance constraint and focus on achieving k−fairness 2 which is a generalization of max − min. Possibility results are shown for k = 1, 3 whereas k = 2 leads to an impossibility result. Atlamaz and Yengin [27] provide tight bounds on inefficiency arising from k−fairness in terms of budget deficit bound. Wang et al. [28] consider a form of VCG mechanism with the AGV (C. d'Aspremont and L.-A. Gérard-Varet) [29] tax-form (an idea arising out of [29] and [30] ). The problem is of Bayesian mechanism design with strong budget balance and efficient allocations. The authors formulate max − min in this scenario as a parameter optimization problem and present an algorithm to solve it.
The work of [31] is motivated by the second reason mentioned above for departing from the SoU social objective, in the context of dynamic pricing for electricity markets. The dual version of the resource allocation optimization problem is considered and additional structure is introduced on the dual variables to ensure less variation between them. This would typically ensure less fluctuation in prices (and 1 Note that this exchange refers to both allocation of good and taxes. 2 k−fairness is said to have been achieved if at equilibrium every agents achieves utility of at least − v [k] N , where v [k] is the k th lowest cost and N is the number of agents. thus in the monetary transfers) since it is well-known that the dual variables for resource allocation optimization problems act as prices in the corresponding markets.
Radunović and Boudec [32] provide a centralized (non-strategic, non-decentralized) algorithm for max − min fair allocation, with applications to wireless network problems. The proposed algorithm generalizes the well-known waterfilling solutions. The authors demonstrate that the max − min fair allocation is derived from the geometric properties of the feasible allocation set. Recently, in the area of green communications, analysis has focused on strategic behavior in large-scale, multi-agent systems with decentralization of information. Bedeer et al. [33] introduce a fairness-based metric for energy efficiency in wireless communication (nonstrategic), which results in a max − min optimization problem. Readers may refer to [34] for a comparative study on different fairness metrics for resource allocation in networking.
We would like to clarify that "fairness" when used in this paper refers to allocating resources such that all agents receive utilities as close to each other as possible. This is different from the notion of "proportional fairness" [6] , [35] in resource allocation problems which is a technique to translate demands into allocation in a proportional manner. It is also different from the idea of fairness used in scheduling algorithms for resource allocation [36] - [39] , which refers to ensuring average processor time assigned to each agent is proportional to their cost. The challenge for the mechanism design problem such as ours is to elicit information about private utility functions in order to make utilities closer at equilibrium. Also the model considered here is of non-cooperation and thus fairness based on cooperative models [40] that provide solutions like bargaining are not considered.
In this paper, we ask if and how we can design mechanisms that implement social objectives that are especially designed for fairness and go beyond the standard objective of SoU. We seek a methodology that is flexible enough to create space for the designer when other notions of fairness might be too stringent. We consider the problem of demand-side management in smart grids as a specific motivating application. The contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
• We consider the form of the social objective given by the additive function
where v(x; θ i ) is the utility of the i -th user with allocation x and type θ i , and g (z) is a family of concave functions parametrized by > 0. This is taken such that at = 0, the objective is simply the SoU i.e., g 0 (z) = z; while as the parameter increases, g (·) becomes more concave. Therefore, as increases, more fairness is built into the allocation and comparison from the baseline case of SoU ( = 0) can be made. Note that unlike agents' utilities, the choice of the specific function g is in the designer's hand, as long as it serves the design objective of fairer allocation.
• Within this framework we ask for which values of the parameter and under what conditions for g (·) is dominant strategy implementation possible and when is Bayesian Nash Equilbrium (BNE) implementation possible. We show that indeed mechanism design is possible provided is not too large, by providing an upper bound on the range of . This is done by formulating the incentive compatibility con-straints as a set of linear inequalities on the design variables and checking whether this system (together with strong budget balance and/or individual rationality) is feasible. Our proving techniques follow closely the work of [30] and [41] . Not surprisingly, the results in the Bayesian set-up are derived under certain assumptions on the prior beliefs, p i (θ −i |θ i ), of agents, which generalize the notion of independent beliefs.
• For the case of Bayesian mechanism design, we go one step further and propose a modification to our mechanism which ensures not only that truth-telling is a BNE but also that it is the only BNE. This provides robustness to the mechanism as prediction/focusing towards a specific desired equilibrium is no longer needed. For general Bayesian mechanism design, Mookherjee and Reichelstein [42] have derived a set of sufficient conditions under which augmenting the message space results in full implementation. Our approach is different from that of [42] in that the sufficient condition is easier to verify and a precise modification to the mechanism is presented. This modification doesn't make significant changes to the mechanism and only requires exchange of one additional message.
• We finally demonstrate that the range of induced by our methodology (from Section III and IV) is sufficient to provide quite significant gains in fairness -as measured by the decrease in several measures of disparity. This is done for dominant implementation through analytically solving for relevant quantities for the scenario of two-type agents. Similarly, for Bayesian implementation, we carry out a numerical study for the smart grid application introduced in Section II-A.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: Section II-A describes a simplified model for demand-side management of smart grids motivating the need for fairness in mechanism design. Section II-B defines the general centralized problem which has been modified for fairness. The next two sections prove the existence of mechanisms that implement the centralized problem for type sets of size two in dominant strategy (Section III) and for general finite type sets in BNE (Section IV). Section V presents the modification for full Bayesian implementation. The analytical derivation for dominant strategy implementation is worked out in Section VI and the numerical study for the smart grid application is presented in Section VII. Finally, Section VIII discusses future work and immediate extensions of the main results in this paper.
II. MOTIVATING APPLICATION AND GENERAL MODEL
A. Demand-Side Management of Smart Grids
In this section we discuss a practical application, as a motivation for our work, from demand-side management of smart grids using a simplified version of the model described in [19] .
We assume a power system with N users and a single supplier. The supplier does not have any decision making power and is considered a passive agent. Each user has a decision to make namely, the power level he/she wants to consume. It is assumed that the user loads are priceelastic [43] i.e., users can decide the power level they want for themselves after taking price into consideration. The system runs for a single time slot. 3 Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) denote the power consumption profile of all the users. Owing to the power demand of must-run loads, for each user, the power consumption has a minimum m i limit, which is considered public information. 4 This gives the feasible set of power allocation as
Users are assumed to be heterogeneous and are modeled by private utility functions [17] , v(x i , θ i ), where x i is the allocation and parameter θ i ∈ i represents each user's value for power. Following [19] we assume quadratic utilities of the form
The power supplier, although is a passive agent, incurs a cost for supplying the total power demanded. This cost is assumed to be an increasing, quadratic (convex) function, C(y) = ay 2 , where a is a technology dependent parameter and y = N i=1 x i is the total demanded power. Most of the literature on mechanism design for efficient allocation of power defines efficiency from a market point of view i.e., power is allocated such that the sum of utilities is maximized i.e.,
Setting aside for the time being the issue of how this problem can be solved in a decentralized way in the presence of strategic agents, let us study the solution of the centralized problem (2) . For this definex(θ ) as the maximizer in (2), where
For illustration, we consider a specific instance of the problem in (2) with the following parameters. Users can be of two types, either high type (i.e., users who have a high valuation for power) with parameter θ H = 15 or low type (i.e., users who have a low valuation for power) with parameter θ L = 5. There are N = 100 users and 10% of them are of high type. Due to the symmetry of the system the solution x(θ ) to (2) can be expressed by just two numbers: allocation to agents with high type, sayx H , and allocation to agents with low type, sayx L . These results are provided in Table I . We also tabulate the corresponding utilities achieved at this allocation, together with different measures of disparity: (a) the standard deviation, σ ; (b) the normalized standard deviation by the mean, σ/μ; and (c) the Gini coefficient (GC). 5 It is evident that there is a great disparity in the solution of the SoU problem (2) regardless of the measure of disparity one considers.
Now consider the problem of mechanism design when allocation is through (2) . We choose as our baseline case the widely used and accepted Vickerey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [22] . Indeed, VCG is proven to be a truthful mechanism when allocation is based on SoU and moreover, it provides implementation in dominant strategies and thus is robust with respect to information available to agents. Each agent is taxed based on the quoted type profile by all agents.
Due to the symmetry of the system,the VCG taxes can be expressed by two quantities,t H (taxes paid by users that quote type as x H ) andt L (taxes paid by users that quote type as x L ). In the last three columns in Table I we present results on disparity in taxes paid by different agents by the same three measures mentioned above. As above, there is disparity in the tax paid between agents, an expected result since in a market, agents who pay more can get more. Now suppose that a designer wants to impose a fairer or less disparate allocation of power and consequently taxes. The main question is how can this be achieved? We outline our approach below in the context of the aforementioned application and develop this approach in the general case in the rest of the paper.
We propose that the designer solves the following optimization problem instead of (2) 
where g(·) is a concave, increasing function. Due to the concavity of g(·) the law of diminishing returns ensures that the resulting optimal allocation is less disparate than the one from (2). Consequently, the allocation resulting from (3) is preferable for a designer interested in fairer allocation. However, this allocation cannot be implemented through the VCG mechanism. The reason is that although the designer allocates through (3), each user optimizes his/her true net utility, and as a result the objectives of the designer and the user are not aligned through the VCG taxes. Hence, for a designer who wants to implement a fairer allocation from (3), the question is whether there is a truthful taxation mechanism for implementing this allocation in the presence of strategic agents. In a nutshell, this paper provides sufficient conditions under which the answer to the above question is positive.
B. General Centralized Problem
For a system of agents N = {1, . . . , N}, allocation is defined via the following optimization problem:
where X ⊂ R N + is the constraint set, θ = (θ i ) i∈N ∈ × i∈N i is the type profile of agents and i is the discrete type set for agent i with | i | = L i . The utility function v(x; θ i ) measures agent i 's satisfaction at allocation x with private type being θ i . A concave transformation g (·) is applied for making the allocation fairer compared to the SoU setup. It is further assumed that the functions g : R → R and v(·; θ i ) : R N + → R are such that the optimization has a unique solution (e.g., if v(·; θ i ), g (·), g (v(·; θ i )) are concave and increasing and X is a convex set).
Specifically the form g (z) = z − f (z) for ≥ 0 is considered, where f (·) is assumed to be a convex function. Note that at = 0 optimization (4) becomes the SoU problem, while as increases from 0 the function g has a stronger concave component. The form g (z) = z − f (z) is considered without significant loss generality, since it closely emulates Taylor's series (w.r.t. ) of many interesting families of concave functions. Consider for example the family h (z)
where z log(z) is indeed convex. In any case, the validity of a particular choice of the function f (·) has to be justified in a specific application by the reduction of an appropriate disparity measure it achieves.
III. DOMINANT STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION
The Mechanism design problem in this section is to find a message space M = × i∈N M i and allocation, tax functions (x, t) : M → X × R N such that the induced game for agents in N with action space M and quasi-linear utilities
has a dominant strategy equilibrium 6 m for which x(m ) =x (θ ), where θ = (θ i ) i∈N is the true type profile. This is known as Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC).
In general, dominant strategy implementation is very restrictive (note that the well studied VCG mechanisms are no longer applicable since this is not the maximization of SoU). Following [29] , the special case of L i = 2 ∀ i ∈ N is considered in this section. In particular, each agent is assumed to have a high and a low type, i.e.
The proposed mechanism is a direct mechanism, thus M i = i ∀ i ∈ N . Agents report their types (possibly untruthfully) φ = (φ i ) i∈N and the allocation they receive on the basis of this is the optimal allocationx (φ) for the quoted type profile φ, wherex (·) is defined in (4) .
Assuming that for not participating in the mechanism, an agent receives 0 utility value (including 0 tax), the voluntary participation condition for dominant strategy implementation is
This is the ex-post version of the individual rationality (IR). We now explain the intuition behind the main result in this section and subsequently formalize it Theorem 1. It has been shown in the literature [29] that for the SoU optimization problem (under certain conditions) there exists a mechanism which implements the optimal allocation in dominant strategies. However, when the optimization problem changes to the one in (4), implementation may not be possible since the designer's objective (objective in (4)) is not aligned with the individual users' objectives which are always of the form v(x (θ ); θ i ) − t i (θ ). In fact, as increases from zero, the two objectives become more and more different. In Theorem 1 we are trying to quantify this effect by showing that for sufficiently small , the first order differences − f (v(x; θ i )) do not affect implementability. We do that by summarizing this effect in the quantity K (·) defined in Condition (A 1 ). Intuitively, as increases the feasibility set defining taxes that satisfy the DSIC and IR conditions shrinks and at some point vanishes.
Next we state the assumption on (4) under which the main result in this section is derived. For the optimization (4), first
Optimality conditions from (4) imply that the above difference is always non-negative, sincex
However, due to the finite type spaces, the difference above is expected to be strictly positive. We formalize this expectation into the following condition.
Condition (A 1 ) need only be checked at = 0. By continuity of the optimization on parameter , this will imply that these conditions continue to hold for all 0 ≤ < max for some max > 0.
The first contribution of this paper is summarized in the following theorem. Proof: Please see Appendix A. The relation between max and˜ max is defined in the proof, specifically via the relation in (25) .
The theorem is proved in two parts, firstly the DSIC condition is stated as a system of linear inequality constraints on the taxes (which act as design variables). In the spirit of the technique used in [30] , Farkas Lemma is used to get an alternate condition which is equivalent to satisfying DSIC. This alternate condition can be rewritten so that dual variables arising from the Farkas Lemma are eliminated and thus the condition contains no unknowns and only the parameters of the problem. Finally these conditions are compared with Condition (A 1 ) to get the result and the precise value of˜ max .
Note that the stricter, but easier to verify condition
is sufficient to guarantee that Condition (A 1 ) is satisfied. Note that the above condition and similarly condition (A 1 ) do not impose a restriction on the agents' types but only on the maximum value of for which dominant implementation can be guaranteed. This implies that the functions
, cannot be made to be as concave as the designer might have wanted in order to have a fairer allocation, while still achieving implementation in dominant strategies.
IV. BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we drop the assumption from the previous section that the type sets are binary and we consider type sets of arbitrary size. Dominant strategy implementation is too restrictive for the general scenario, hence the next best reasonable solution concept -Bayesian implementation, is considered.
In a Bayesian set up, agents have a prior distribution on the type profile. For agent i , prior is p i ∈ ( ). For basic regularity assume that the prior gives non-zero probability on all points of (this is only a technical condition and the ensuing results can be proved without it as well). These priors are assumed to be common knowledge between agents and designer -hence there is no need to introduce second order beliefs over the priors and so on.
The mechanism used is a direct mechanism with allocation functionx (·), as defined in (4) . Given the allocation and tax functions (x , t) : → X × R N , the utility function in the Bayesian set up for strategy profile σ = σ j : j → j j ∈N is given by, ∀ i ∈ N ,
where θ i is the true type of agent i and the expectation is conditioned on it. The Bayesian implementation conditionalso known as Bayesian Strategy Incentive Compatibility (BSIC)-for the direct mechanism is that the truthful strategy
∈ N must be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) 7 for the induced Bayesian game. In addition, it is required the tax function to have the Strong Budget Balance (SBB) property, i.e.,
We restrict attention to optimization (4) and priors p i (·) i∈N that satisfy the following conditions. Condition (A 2 ): Assume that ∃ max > 0 such that H ( ) > 0 for all 0 ≤ < max , where
This is the most general form of the assumption needed about the optimization. More relaxed assumptions are discussed later in this section.
Condition (B):
Assume that for any non-zero vector R := (R(ψ)) ψ∈ with R(ψ) ∈ R, there does not exist any
Note that Condition (B) involves only the priors. This condition was first introduced in [29] and is a generalization of independent priors, i.e., p j (ψ − j | ψ j ) = p j (ψ − j ) (refer to [29] for an example of priors which are not conditionally independent but still satisfy the condition above).
The second contribution of this paper is summarized in the following theorem. Proof: Please see Appendix C. The proof of this theorem begins by modifying tax variables t to new variables z where the relation between the two is such that SBB is always satisfied (without losing generality); this is the famous AGV form of taxes [30] . As in Section III, the BSIC condition on the design variables z is stated as a system of linear inequalities which is further converted into an alternate expression by the use of Farkas Lemma. Unlike Section III though the dual variables can't be eliminated in this case. With the help of Condition (B) the alternate condition is further simplified to a convenient form which is then rewritten (by exchange of summation order) in a way that can be compared to Condition (A 2 ). This leads to the result and also the precise value of˜ max For ease of verification, instead of checking (12) one can alternatively check the stricter condition
or even
where
These conditions are easier to verify since they are prior-independent and depend only on the optimization problem (4). Also, it is straightforward to check that (15a) ⇒ (14) ⇒ Condition (A 2 ). We finally mention that as in the case discussed in Section III, the above condition, due to continuity, need only be checked at = 0. Note that the SBB condition in (11) is an additional property that we impose on the design of the mechanism and not an additional assumption. In other words, if one removes this additional requirement, all our results will still hold, and furthermore, the range of allowable values of will further increase.
V. FULL BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION
In accordance with the majority of the literature on Bayesian implementation (see for e.g. [3] , [44] - [46] ), the main result in the previous section aimed at BSIC condition for implementation. This ensures that truth-telling is a BNE but gives no information about other possible BNE. In general this may be a problem, since when the Bayesian game is played, the designer cannot predict in advance which BNE will be achieved. The justification used in such a situation is that of "focusing". 8 Along with the mechanism, the selected BNE is also announced by the designer. All the agents are then focused towards this particular BNE and in anticipation that others will be playing according to it, they too choose to play it.
In this section we modify our mechanism by augmenting each agents' message space to include one additional message -which takes values in a continuous space -with the specific aim of achieving full implementation, i.e., truth-telling as the only BNE. This will add to the robustness of the mechanism and will put to rest any equilibrium selection issues. Such a modification only requires that the BSIC constraints (see (35a)) can be satisfied with strict inequality. This gives the designer room to alter taxes.
For general Bayesian mechanism design, Mookherjee and Reichelstein [42] have derived sufficient conditions under which augmenting the message space results in full implementation. We choose however not to follow this technique, since it only provides existence results and the sufficient condition itself is difficult to check since it requires searching over functions. Instead, a concrete augmentation of message space and a concrete modification of the mechanism is proposed below.
In our analysis we restrict attention to private goods i.e., any agent i 's utility is affected only by level of his/her consumption level x i and the scenario where the utility functions v i (·) are differentiable. Extending to general public goods is possible, but will make the proofs more technical and obfuscate the basic idea behind them. Similarly, mean value theorem can be used (to replace derivatives) but it will make the analysis more technical.
The new message space, allocation and taxes for any agent i are
wherex (φ) is the allocation function defined in (4) and t i (φ) is a tax designed for BSIC and SBB (from the previous section). Also, δ, B > 0 are constants chosen by the designer. In particular, δ is a small constant, the choice of which will be clear in the proof of Theorem 3. The constant B is chosen to be large enough so that no rational agent will ever choose message y i = ±δ. This is possible because due to the type sets being discrete, the utilities are bounded. The modification above allows agents to change their allocation by a small amount y i ∈ [−δ, +δ]. For this increase/decrease in allocation they are charged/subsidized at the "market" price v (x ,i (φ); φ i ) corresponding to the truth-telling strategy. This modification serves the purpose of giving agents more delicate control of their allocation and utility than in a discrete set-up. Technically, this allows the designer to disrupt any BNE at which the price an agent is capable of paying (i.e., his/her derivative without tax terms) doesn't match the market price designed for truthful strategies. (2) 
Theorem 3: Assuming that the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied and the space of taxes has a proper interior (i.e., all incentive inequalities are satisfied strictly), then for the mechanism defined in (16) at any true type profile
θ = (θ i ) i∈N , (1) message m = m i i∈N = (θ i , 0) i∈N is a BNE. Furthermore, assuming ∀ i ∈ N , (θ i , φ i ) ∈ F i , the sign of the quantity v (x ,i (φ i , φ −i ); θ i )−v (x ,i (φ i , φ −i ); φ i ) remains the same ∀ φ −i ∈ −i ,
any message other than m is not a BNE. Hence the mechanism in (16) achieves full Bayesian implementation.
Proof: Please see Appendices D and E. Several comments are in order regarding the statement and the proof of theorem. The condition just prior to Part (2) of the theorem can be interpreted as follows. Start with a stricter condition: sign of v (x; θ i )−v (x; φ i ) is the same for all x ∈ X . Based on this the types in i can be ordered solely based on the derivative they induce. This ordering, which is otherwise not possible (since the expression can in general have different signs as x varies), has further significance. In SoU problems (like (4) at = 0), optimal allocation is dependent only on the rate of growth of utilities. 9 Thus for ordered types, from (4) at = 0, optimal allocation for an agent depends monotonically on their type irrespective of others' types. The actual condition prior to Part (2) of the theorem is a simpler version of the stricter condition and requires checking for only finite number of arguments.
The proof of the first part of the theorem begins by establishing that truth-telling is better for any agent given that others are playing m −i . Then, further optimization on the y i variable, with the use of calculus (since the utility depends on this continuously), proves that truth-telling and y i = 0 is indeed a BNE.
The proof of the second part of the theorem relies on establishing a profitable deviation with the y i variable (for some agent i ) whenever the message is different from m . The gap in the incentive inequalities (assumed at the beginning of the theorem) determines the range for y i i.e. value of the δ.
In general, the proof of Part (2) of the theorem requires for all θ i , i and σ −i , the quantities (17) to remain non-zero whenever σ i (θ i ) = θ i . Any condition that ensures that for any non-truthful strategy σ there exist an agent i and type θ i for which the above expression is nonzero, would be sufficient for the theorem to hold. For example, given type sets, utilities and the optimization, a condition on the priors may then be sufficient. Furthermore, such condition wouldn't significantly reduce the set of possible priors since the space of priors is essentially equivalent to R N i=1 L i −1 while only a finite set of hyperplanes are eliminated from it.
Finally, the mechanism presented has the SBB property only at BNE. However, as in the proof of Theorem 2, using the AGV form for budget balanced taxes i.e.,t i (m) = z i (m) − 1 N−1 j =iz j (m) a similar modification can make the mechanism in (16) budget balanced off-equilibrium as well. In order to effectively convey the salient features of the augmentation for full implementation we presented the mechanism without this modification.
VI. AN ANALYTICAL EXAMPLE FOR DOMINANT IMPLEMENTATION
This section contains analysis of an example where we are interested in evaluating the gain in overall fairness w.r.t. allocation and taxes, attained with the proposed method. The example considered provides closed form expressions for the relevant quantities from the optimization (4), which enables a closed form expression for the gains in fairness.
where θ H > θ L > 0 and linear utilities with private consumption i.e., v(x; θ i ) := θ i x i (this is a simplification over piecewise linear utilities, for e.g. [47] uses it in an energy storage application, [48] uses it in resource allocation on wireless networks). The constraint set is X = {x ∈ R 
At
= 0 the objective is exactly the SoU. As starts increasing from 0 onwards, the optimization problem is transformed such that higher utilities will be weighed less than lower ones -thereby giving closer to equal distribution of allocation.
Due to the symmetric nature of the problem, the solution can be described by the pair (x H , x L ), which denotes the allocation to any agent with type θ H , θ L , respectively. Generically we denote by m ∈ {0, . . . , N} the number of agents with type θ H . At = 0 a solution (there are multiple) to the above is
, the unique solution is
Dominant implementation condition from the proof of Theorem 1 is satisfied if˜ max is such that
The inequality is calculated so that the expression is independent of m.
The main quantity of interest is the variation in the utility
. We consider the well known Gini coefficient (GC) as a measure of disparity in allocation.
where GC depends on via x H , x L . Fig. 1 plots GC vs. for N = 50, (θ H , θ L ) = (1, 0.75) and three cases m ∈ {9, 24, 39}. In this example˜ max = 14. As is evident from Fig. 1 , there is considerable reduction in the GC in the range of allowable . The gains are particularly significant for smaller values of m i.e., m = 9, 24 since in those cases the inequality in allocation is significant to begin with (at = 0). 
VII. BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION FOR SMART GRID DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT
This section considers the case of Bayesian implementation and further elaborates on the smart grid application presented in Section II-A.
For the numerical analysis we consider parameters (as in
In this application we have symmetric agents and hence any profile of types θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ 100 ) can be represented by a single number m ∈ {0, . . . , 100} which represents the number of agents with type θ H . A common prior Binomial(100, 0.1) is assumed on m, so the typical number of high-type users is 10. Also note that both allocation and taxes, which are a function of type profile θ can now be represented as functions of the variable m i.e.,
For appropriate comparison with the results in the literature we do not consider the SBB constraints for this example. Figure 2 depicts two quantities as a function of . First, H ( ) defined in (12) in Condition (A 2 ) in Section IV. We find that H ( ) > 0 for all ≤ 0.025. For this specific example, since the types are binary and agents are symmetric, the BSIC constraints imposed on the taxes (as shown in (35a)) simplify to a single inequality of the form A ≥ 0. The second quantity plotted in Figure 2 is A. From this plot, we ascertain that taxes satisfying BSIC exist for up to ≤ 0.2. This implies that the sufficient condition (A 2 ) imposes almost an order of magnitude less max compared to the one imposed by the looser condition (35a) required in the proof. We make two comments regarding this discrepancy. First, in cases where agents aren't symmetric or the number of types is more than two, one cannot represent feasibility in the simplified form A ≥ 0 and so one has to rely on sufficient condition (A 2 ). Second, as will be shown in the subsequent analysis, even this reduced range of provides significant gains in fairness. Figure 3 depicts GC and the standard deviation, σ (dual y-axes) of the utility at optimal allocation, v(x ,i (θ ), θ i ) i∈N vs. , for the typical case of m = 10. The GC value is 73% at = 0, 55% at = 0.025 and 15% at = 0.2. Recall that GC is a normalized quantity with 100% being extreme case of unfairness and 0% being fairest. This demonstrates that even under the stringent sufficient condition (A 2 ) we can have reduction of GC by 18 percentage points (and a further reduction by another 40 percentage points if we choose the extreme value of max = 0.2 dictated by (35a)). A similar decreasing trend is also evident for the standard deviation, as increases.
The results in Section IV guarantee existence of taxes such that BSIC are satisfied. This means that there is a non-empty feasible set of taxes (shown to be a polytope in the proof, Appendix C). In order to fully specify taxes a designer can choose any point within this non-empty set. In the following, we consider two such choices detailed below.
• The first one minimizes the expected total tax paid by agents over the non-empty feasible set. In this case, we impose two further practical constraints. First, all taxes are non-negative and second, the expected payoff of the supplier (revenue minus cost) must be positive. If this were not true then the supplier would be better off not participating. Figure 4 depicts standard deviation σ in the tax vector t 1 (θ ), . . . , t N (θ ) with m = 10 vs. , as well as the mean w.r.t. m. For the case of m = 10, the σ value is 0.51 at = 0, 0.26 at = 0.025 and 0.026 at = 0.2, and similar trends are observed for the mean σ . This justifies one of the stated goals of this work, which is to lower tax fluctuation between agents.
• The second one maximizes the expected total tax paid by agents (i.e., revenue for the producer). In this case, we impose the non-negative constraint on taxes as above, and a complementary constraint of individual rationality of each user. This ensures that at equilibrium users are better off than not participating. Figure 4 also depicts the standard deviation in the tax vector t 1 (θ ), . . . , t N (θ ) with m = 10 vs. , as well as the mean w.r.t. m, with similar trends observed as above. The above results can be compared to two well-accepted baseline designs. The first one is the VCG which results in standard deviation of the tax vector equal to 5.9 (typical i.e., m = 10) and equal to 6 (average). As the second baseline design we consider a Stackelberg Game played between the supplier and users [49, Ch. 12, Bertrand Competition] . Supplier plays first by setting the price, agents play next by setting their demand equal to the level that maximizes their own utility (for this to be well-posed we assume minimum demand m i = 0). Anticipating this the supplier sets that price which maximizes his/her expected payoff, revenue minus cost. This is the same as Peak Load Pricing (PLP) scheme mentioned in [19] , applied to a single-shot model. This scheme results in standard deviation of the tax vector equal to 0.59 (typical i.e., m = 10) and equal to 0.6 (average).
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Fairness for resource allocation problems in the presence of strategic agents has received relatively less attention due to lack of mathematical convenience in analysis. This paper proposes a new concept of fairness in resource allocation problems that goes beyond SoU maximization. This fairness aspect is adjustable (through the selection of the parameter and the function f (·)) in a family of functions, thus giving a wide range that a designer may exploit at their own discretion. The main result proves the existence of incentive mechanisms that implement the fairer allocation proposed in dominant and Bayesian equilibria (in respective cases). Analytical and numerical results indicate that through the proposed techniques there are significant gains in fairness of allocation, within the permissible limits of the design method. The theoretical results are justified by discussing a specific model for demandside management in smart grids. Finally a modification of our mechanism is presented, which guarantees truth-telling as the only BNE. This is done by adding one continuous message per agent, other than his/her type. This modification is especially useful in situations where selection of equilibria is too complex to predict.
Although the form considered in (4) is g (z) = z − f (z), it is easy to see that the results can be extended to cases where f depends on ; as long as terms of the form f (z, ) → 0 as → 0. Ideally one would like to consider the class of g (z) = z 1− , so as to reconcile with known fair social utilities such as the geometric mean and min utility. This however may not be a practical necessity since as indicated by the results in Sections VI, VII, even the form g (z) = z − z 2 provides a significant reduction in disparity of allocation, utilities and taxes. 
From the definition in (7), we have
Using the above twice, first with
, and adding the two results in (using the notation from proof of Theorem 1)
This can be rewritten as
Thus it is sufficient to prove that the RHS above is nonnegative. Owing to Condition (A 1 ), ∃ max > 0 such that the sum of the first two terms in RHS is strictly positive for all 0 ≤ < max and clearly the second term can be made arbitrarily small in magnitude (by choosing a smaller max ). Hence the condition in (22) is satisfied 10 for all 0 ≤ <˜ max . The value˜ max is bigger or smaller than max depending on whether 
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof: Note that the taxes are a finite collection of variables, since , N are both finite sets. For the DSIC constraints to be satisfied, the following constraints must hold
This gives truth-telling as a dominant strategy for agent i regardless of types of others. For IR, the following constraints must be satisfied
10 Overall the behaviour of K i (θ i , φ i , θ −i , ) w.r.t. will dictate the value of max ,˜ max . This in turn will effect the usefulness of this method, since a designer might want to ensure certain minimum gains in fairness for which he/she might want to choose as large as possible.
From the above sets of constraints it is clear that one can
and
Using the Farkas Lemma, the above system is feasible in t if and only if ∀ λ ∈ R 4
The equality constraints on λ give that λ 1 + λ 3 = λ 2 and λ 2 + λ 4 = λ 1 . These give λ 3 = λ 4 = 0. Hence λ ∈ R 4 + can be parametrized as λ = (ξ, ξ, 0, 0) for ξ ∈ R + . Thus for feasibility, using Farkas Lemma, the condition that must be satisfied is
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: The utility for any agent i when other agents are truth-telling is
where agent i 's true and quoted types are θ i , φ i ∈ i , respectively. We consider taxes in the AGV form [30] ,
Taxes in this form always satisfy SBB and any tax function which satisfies SBB can be written in this form. Therefore WLOG, the design variables henceforth are z j (ψ) j ∈N ψ∈ . BSIC constraints can be written as:
So the condition for design of taxes is a linear system of inequalities and can be written in the form Az ≤ b where the indexing is as follows:
The rest of the proof will be to show that this linear system is feasible in variable z, using the Farkas Lemma 11 [50, p. 201] .
The above equation can be rearranged to give that
Denote the RHS above by R(ψ) and note that it depends only on ψ and not j . 11 Relevant version of the Farkas alternative result: The system
is feasible iff all solutions λ ∈ R M + of A λ = 0 satisfy b λ ≥ 0.
Proof:
Here (40c), (40e) follows by application of (38) and other equations are just by rearranging summation terms. With the application of above Lemma, one can rewrite the LHS of (38) to get that ∀ j, ψ,
Condition (B) on priors states that there exist no λ ∈ such that above holds for a non-zero R. Hence A λ = 0 implies that R ≡ 0, therefore (by (38) 
Next we show that for all λ ∈ that satisfy (42) we have b λ ≥ 0 i.e., 
Denote the RHS expression in (44) as η = η 1 + η 2 , where
Now continuing from the LHS of (43b), LHS of (43b)= i∈N
For any fixed i , consider the summation with only η 1 first
By (42), the inside summation in the first term is equal to p i (θ −i | φ i ) ψ i λ(φ i , ψ i ). Incorporating this and changing variables of summation appropriately gives the overall summation from (47) equal to 0. Now consider the term in the RHS of (46) with η 2
Rearranging terms in η 2 , we can write
Therefore by Condition (A 2 ), ∃ max > 0 such that for all 0 ≤ < max , the inside summation in (48) At equilibrium, the above derivative will have to be zero since the end points ±δ cannot be maximizers -since they incur a huge tax B. Also note that since v(x i ; θ i ) is assumed to be concave in x i (for any θ i ) the utility u i (σ, ρ|θ i ) in (51) is concave in ρ i (θ i ) and thus the condition in (53) is both necessary and sufficient for optimality w.r.t. ρ i (θ i ).
The expression in (53) is clearly equal to 0 when σ i (θ i ) = θ i and ρ i (θ i ) = 0. Hence applying the above result for all θ i ∈ i and i ∈ N gives that m = (θ, 0) is a BNE.
